Abstract: This article discusses the microstructure of the U.S. Treasury securities market. Treasury securities are nominally riskless debt instruments issued by the U.S. government. Microstructural analysis is a field of economics/finance that examines the roles played by heterogenous agents, institutional detail, and asymmetric information in the trading process. The article describes types of Treasury issues; stages of the Treasury market; the major players, including the role of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the interdealer brokers; the structure of both the spot and futures markets; the findings of the seasonality/announcement and order book literature; and research on price discovery. We conclude by discussing possible future avenues of research.
Introduction
We begin by describing the types of Treasury issues and the major Treasury market participants, including the Federal Reserve, primary dealers and the major electronic brokers. We then outline the stages of the Treasury market, from auction announcements to the secondary market. Next, we examine several closely related areas of the literature: Seasonality in the Treasury market and the reactions of the Treasury market to macro and monetary announcements; discontinuities in Treasury prices; and the effect of order flow in Treasury markets. We then discuss modeling and other academic questions about the Treasury market.
Types of Treasury Issues
As of October 2007, the U.S. Treasury issued four types of debt instruments. The shortest-maturity instruments are known as Treasury bills. 22 .6% of the marketable U.S. debt is in bills, securities with maturities of 1 year or less. Bills are sold at a discount and redeemed at their face value at 3 maturity. They do not pay any coupons prior to maturity and currently have maturities up to 26 weeks. Treasury bill prices are usually quoted in "discount rate" terms, which are calculated with an actual/360 day count convention, T-bill discount rate = [face value -bill price] × (360/number of days until maturity).
Thus, a bill with a face value of $100, 000, a cash price of $97, 500 and 90 days to maturity will have a discount rate of 10% = [100 − 97.5] × (360/90) in a newspaper. Treasury bill yields are often quoted as "bond equivalent yields," which are defined as, T-bill yield = [ face value − bill price bill price ] × (365/number of days until maturity). There is also an active market in STRIPS (Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities) which are popularly known as "zero coupon" bonds. These instruments are created by the Treasury through an accounting system which separates coupon interest payments and principal. Finally, the U.S. Treasury also issues savings bonds, low denomination securities for retail investors. 4 
Treasury instruments with intermediate maturities (2-
,
Treasury Market Participants

The Federal Reserve in the Treasury Market
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, under the guidance of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), is a uniquely important player in the Treasury market. The FOMC meets approximately every six weeks to review economic conditions and determine a target for the federal funds rate, the rate at which U.S. banks borrow/lend reserve balances from/to each other. The manager of the Open Market Desk (a.k.a., "the Desk") at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is responsible for ensuring that the average federal funds transaction is close to the target by buying and selling
Treasury instruments (primarily short-term). In practice, the Desk accomplishes this in two ways.
First the Desk buys sufficient Treasuries to satisfy most but not all the markets' demand for deposits at the Fed. Secondly, the Desk buys Treasuries via repurchase (repos) agreements (overnight and for terms of several days) to achieve a desired repo rate that influences the federal funds rate and other short-term interest rates through arbitrage.
To determine day-to-day actions, every morning, staff at both the Division of Monetary Affairs of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Desk forecast that day's demand for reserve balances. The Desk staff also consults market participants to get their views on financial conditions. The relevant Desk and Board staffs then exchange views in a 9 am conference call.
Finally, the relevant Desk staff, the Board staff, and at least one of the voting Reserve Bank
Presidents then confer during a second conference call at about 9:20 am. The Desk staff summarizes market conditions, projects actions for the day and asks the voting Reserve Bank President(s) for comments. Open market operations commence shortly after the conclusion of this call.
When the Desk buys Treasuries, it increases available liquidity (reserves) in debt markets and tends to lower interest rates. Selling Treasuries has the opposite effect, lowering reserves and raising interest rates. If the intention is to make a permanent change in reserves, then outright purchases or sales are undertaken. In contrast, if the Desk anticipates that only temporary changes in reserves are necessary, it uses repos (for purchases) or reverse repos (for sales). Bernanke [7] notes that actual open market sales of debt instruments are rare; it is more common for the Federal
Reserve to allow such securities to expire without replacing them. Both open market sales and allowing the Fed's securities to expire have the same balance sheet effects: The Fed holds fewer bonds and more cash, while the public will hold more bonds and less cash. [43] gives some historical perspective on operating procedures in the 1980s. 
Primary dealers
Interdealer Brokers
Prior to 2000, voice-assisted brokers dominated secondary market trading in Treasuries. Except for Cantor-Fitzgerald, all these brokers reported their trading activity to GovPX, a consortium. 
Stages of the Treasury Bond Market
The sale of Treasuries undergoes four distinct phases: when issued, primary, on-the-run and offthe-run. Each of these stages has a distinct market structure.
The Primary Market
In the primary market, the U.S. Treasury sells debt to the public via auction. 
The Secondary Market
The secondary market is composed of the when-issued, on-the-run and off-the-run issues.
When-Issued
Even prior to the primary auction, there is an active forward market in Treasury securities (apart from TIPS) that are about to be issued. Trading in the when-issued security market typically begins several days prior to an auction and continues until settlement of auction purchases.
Nyborg and Sundaresan [61] document that when-issued trading provides important information about auction prices prior to the auction and also permits market participants to reduce the risk they take in bidding. Fabozzi and Fleming [25] estimate that 6% of total interdealer trading is in the when-issued market. Just prior to auctions though, these markets become substantially more active. In the bill market, when-issued trading volume exceeds the volume for the bills from the previous auction.
On-the-Run
Upon completion of the auction, the most recently issued bill, note or bond becomes onthe-run and the previous on-the-run issue goes off-the-run. Overall Treasury trading volume is concentrated in a small number of on-the-run issues. Trading in these benchmark on-the-run issues, which Fabozzi and Fleming [25] say constitutes approximately 70% of total trading volume, has migrated almost completely to the electronic networks. Mizrach and Neely [58] estimate a 61% market share for the BrokerTec platform and a 39% share for eSpeed in 2005, which is consistent with industry estimates.
Off-the-Run
With more than 200 off-the-run issues trading in October 2007-44 bills, 116 notes, and 45
bonds-most off-the-run volume takes place in voice and electronic interdealer networks. Barclay, Hendershott and Kotz [5] document the fall in ECN market share when issues go off the run.
They also report that transaction volume falls by more than 90%, on average, once a bond goes 8 off-the-run. The ECN market share falls from 75.2% to 9.9% for the 2-year notes, from 83.5% to 8.5% for the 5-year notes, and from 84.5% to 8.9% for the 10-year notes. Several IDBs handle most off-the-run securities trading.
On-versus Off-the-Run Liquidity and Prices
Off-the-run securities trade at a higher yield (lower price) than on-the-run securities of similar maturity. Many researchers have attempted to explain the yield differential with relative liquidity.
Vayanos and Weill [68] utilize a search theoretic model that is motivated by the fact that bonds may be difficult to locate once they go off-the-run. Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath [36] compare onthe-run and off-the-run Treasuries and show that the liquidity premium depends primarily on the amount of remaining future liquidity, which is highly predictable. The study exploits the fact that the liquidity of a Treasury is predictable. Duffie [18] argues that legal or institutional restrictions on supplying collateral induces "special" repo rates that are much less than market riskless interest rates. The price of the underlying instrument is increased by the present value of the savings in borrowing costs.
Supply Variation and Prices
Although it is generally accepted that the on-the-run premium is due to greater liquidity, the theoretical relation between the supply of a given bond issue and prices is not clear. Do issue sizes produce lower yields (higher prices) through their liquidity effects or whether downwardsloping demand for individual securities would produce higher prices (lower yields) for larger issues?
Empirically, the evidence is mixed. Simon [65] , [66] , Duffie [18] , Seligman [64] and Fleming [29] find that the larger issues lead to lower prices (higher yields), while Amihud and Mendelson [2] , Kamara [51] , Warga [69] , and Elton and Green [23] find the opposite: The liquidity effect predominates, resulting in higher prices (lower yields) for larger issues. There might be a nonlinear relationship.
Liquidity may increase prices up to a certain point, but then finite demand for any individual security reduces the attractiveness of additional supply.
The Treasury Futures Market
Spot markets are not the only markets for U.S. Treasuries. The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) has active futures markets for 2-, 5-, 10-and 30-year U.S. Treasuries. Table 1 briefly describes   9 the CBOT contracts and pricing conventions.
[INSERT Table 1 A variety of Treasury instruments meet the criteria to be deliverable issues. Table 1 describes the pricing conventions and the characteristics of the assets that may be delivered to satisfy the contracts. The CBOT defines "conversion factors" that adjust the quoted futures prices for the asset that is actually delivered. Despite these conversion factors, one issue will be the "cheapest to deliver." Cash prices at delivery depend on both the conversion factor for a particular bond and the interest accrued on that bond since the last coupon payment.
Although agents frequently use the futures markets for hedging or taking positions on future price movements, only a modest amount of microstructure research has focused on futures markets.
Brandt, Kavajecz, and Underwood [11] show that futures and spot market order flow are useful in predicting daily returns in each market and that the type of trader influences the effect of order flow. Mizrach and Neely [59] show that futures markets contribute a substantial amount of price discovery to U.S. Treasury markets. Campbell and Hendry [12] compare price discovery in the 10-year bond and futures contracts in both the United States and Canada.
Seasonality and Announcement Effects
Seasonality and announcement effects are intimately related to the microstructure literature in that the latter seeks to explain how markets with heterogeneous agents react to the release of information.
Seasonality and macroeconomic announcements
The earliest studies considered the issue of daily seasonality in Treasuries. Flannery and Protopapadakis [27] document differing day-of-the-week patterns in Treasuries and stock indices. The patterns in the prices of Treasuries securities vary by maturity and differ from those found in stock indices. They conclude that no single factor explains seasonal patterns across asset classes. In contrast to this day-of-the-week effect in spot T-bills, Johnston et al. [50] find day-of-the-week effects in government national mortgage association (GNMA) securities, T-note, and T-bond futures, but not in T-bill futures. The fact that day-of-the-week effects exist in spot T-bills but not in T-bill futures points up the importance of futures settlement rules.
Later studies began to consider the effects of macro announcements on price changes, volatility, volume and spreads. Macroeconomic announcements have been an especially popular subject of study because they occur at regular intervals that can be anticipated by market participants.
The existence of survey expectations about upcoming macro announcements permits researchers to identify the "shock" component of the announcement, which allows them to investigate the differential effects of anticipated and unanticipated news releases of different magnitudes.
Ederington and Lee [20] [21] did the seminal modern work with intraday data on macro announcement effects in bond markets. They found that volatility increases before the announcement and remains elevated for some time afterwards. The employment, PPI, CPI and durable goods orders releases produce the greatest impact of the 9 significant announcements, out of 16 studied.
Ederington and Lee [22] follow up on their earlier studies by linking the literatures on seasonality and announcements in the bond market. Comparing the contributions of past volatility, seasonality and announcements in predicting intraday volatility bond futures data and exchange rates, these authors argue that announcements account for much of the apparent seasonality in interest rate volatility.
One of the earliest important results was that bond market prices react more strongly to macro announcements than do equity markets. volatility. Importantly, Balduzzi, Elton, and Green [4] argue that the differential impact of news on long and short bond prices indicates that at least two factors will be needed for models of the yield curve. They also present evidence that discontinuities (jumps) will be important in modeling bond prices.
Some recent papers have relaxed the restrictive assumption that announcements influence Treasury market variables in a linear, symmetric fashion. For example, Christie-David, Chaudhry, and
Lindley [15] allow the effects of announcement shocks to depend on the size and sign of the shock.
They measure these nonlinear effects on the intraday 10-and 30-year Treasury futures from 1992 to 1996.
Most studies of the effects of volatility have measured such variation with some function of squared returns. One can use the volatility implied by options prices, however, to measure expected volatility over longer horizons. Heuson and Su [45] , for example, show that implied volatilities from options on Treasuries rise prior to macro announcements and that volatilities quickly return to normal levels after announcements. Beber and Brandt [6] use intraday, tick data from 1995 to 1999 to determine that macro announcements reduce the variance of the option-implied distribution of U.S. Treasury bond prices. The content of the news and economic conditions explain these changes in higher-order moments. The study attributes the results to time-varying risk premia rather than relative mispricing or changing beliefs.
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In a comprehensive study of the impact of U.S. macroeconomic announcements across asset markets, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega [3] study the reaction of international equity, bond and foreign exchange markets. They confirm that U.S. macroeconomic news drives bond prices, as well as those of the other assets.
Monetary policy announcements
Researchers The effect of federal funds target changes on the Treasury yield curve.
Federal funds target changes and the Treasury yield curve
The "expectations hypothesis of the term structure" motivates research on how the short-and long-end of the Treasury yield curve react to unexpected changes in the federal funds target rate.
That is, if the FOMC increases overnight interest rates, how does this change short-and long-term rates?
Using data on 75 changes in the federal funds target from September 1974 through September 1979, Cook and Hahn [16] find that these target changes caused larger movements in short-term rates than in intermediate-and long-term Treasury rates. A difficulty with interpreting the Cook and Hahn [16] results is that efficient markets presumably can often anticipate most or all of a target change and such expectations are already incorporated into the yield curve. To confront this problem, Kuttner [53] decomposes target changes into anticipated and unanticipated components, finding-unsurprisingly-that Treasury rates respond much more strongly to unanticipated changes and that the results are consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. That is, the anticipated component of an interest rate change does not affect expectations. Hamilton [41] carefully reexamines the work of Kuttner [53] , showing that it is robust to uncertainty about the dates of target changes and the effect of learning by market participants.
Poole and Rasche [62] also decompose federal funds target changes into expected and unexpected components-but use a later contract month than Kuttner [53] to avoid problems associated with computation of the contract payoff. They find that interest rates across the maturity spectrum fail to respond to the anticipated components of the changes in the intended funds rate. 13 Poole, Rasche and Thornton [63] One puzzle that has emerged from this literature is that the average effect of changes in the federal funds target on the yield curve is modest, despite the facts that such changes should be an important determinant of the yield curve and that yields are highly volatile around FOMC announcements. Fleming and Piazzesi [31] claim to partially resolve this puzzle by illustrating that such yield changes depend on the shape of the yield curve.
This literature on the reaction of the Treasury market to monetary policy has become progressively more sophisticated in assessing market expectations of Fed policy and modeling institutional features of the futures market and Fed operations. Nevertheless, the underlying conclusion that unanticipated target changes lead to large price increases on short-term Treasuries and smaller changes on the prices of long-term Treasuries has been remarkably robust. Marquering [17] find that macro news announcements strongly affect the daily volatility of longerterm Treasury instruments while FOMC events affect the volatility of shorter-term instruments.
Other Federal Reserve behavior and the Treasury market
Some studies have explored more esoteric components of information about monetary policy.
Boukus and Rosenberg [9] , for example, use Latent Semantic Analysis to decompose the information content of FOMC minutes from 1987 to 2005. They then relate the information content to current and future economic conditions. Chirinko and Curran [13] argue that Federal Reserve speeches, testimonies, and meetings increase price and trading volatility on the 30-year bond market. FOMC meetings are the most important of the events considered. They go on to consider whether these Federal Reserve events merely create noise or transmit information about the future policy decisions or the state of the economy. They conclude that such events may reduce welfare by "overwhelming private information," creating herding behavior.
Announcements and Liquidity Variation
The literature on variation in liquidity and price effects overlaps with the literature on macroeconomic announcements. The seminal work of Amihud and Mendelson [2] showed that yields on short-time-to-maturity Treasuries vary inversely with liquidity. That is, more liquid assets 15 have lower yields/higher prices. Harvey and Huang [43] discovered elevated volatility in interest rate (and foreign exchange) futures markets, in the first 60-70 minutes of trading on Thursdays and Fridays. Ederington and Lee [20] confirmed Harvey and Huang [43] 's speculation that major macroeconomic announcements-especially the employment report, the PPI, the CPI, and durable goods orders-create the intraday and intraweek patterns in the volatility of Treasury bond futures.
Volatility is very high after announcements and remains elevated for hours. Fleming and Remolona [32] extend this work to show that the 25 greatest surges in activity in the 5-year on-the-run bond market came on macroeconomic announcement days, within 70 minutes of the announcement. The most important announcements for trading surges were employment reports, fed funds targets, 30-year auctions, 10-year auctions, the CPI, NAPM surveys, GDP, retail sales, and 3-year auctions.
Releases that affect prices also matter for trading activity. Fleming and Remolona [32] observe that timeliness, the degree of surprise in the announcement and market uncertainty also increase announcements' impact on trading.
Researchers continued to explore the impact of variation in liquidity caused by other events.
For example, Fleming [28] exploits exogenous variation in Treasury issuance to show that securities that are "reopened"-the Treasury sells additional quantities of existing securities-have greater liquidity, lower spreads, than comparable assets. Paradoxically, this higher liquidity does not produce lower yields for the reopened securities.
More recent papers have explored variation in liquidity and volatility across markets. Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam [14] estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) in liquidity and volatility variables in stock and bond markets. They find that common factors make the variables' innovations highly correlated. Volatility shocks predict liquidity variables.
End-of-the-year patterns in one-month Treasury Bills
The previous sets of papers studied daily and intraday seasonality, often as caused by macroeco- Following on related work of Griffiths and Winters [40] in repos, Griffiths and Winters [39] find that yields on one month T-Bills (and other one-month securities) increase significantly at the beginning of December, remain high during December, and return to normal a few days before the year-end. This pattern does not exist in three-month T-bills. Neely and Winters [60] find similar patterns in the one-month LIBOR futures market.
Griffiths and Winters [38] [39] [40] explain this December effect by asserting that a year-end preference for liquidity drives the year-end surge in short-term interest rates. Debt holder (lenders in the money markets) start to liquidate their one-month securities in the last few days of November to meet cash obligations at the end-of-December. This preference for liquidity drives up one-month interest rates for most of December. Liquidity demand returns to normal at the end of December as investors repurchase short-term instruments, and interest rates return to normal levels.
Discontinuities in the U.S. Treasury Market
The literature on discontinuities (or jumps) in Treasury prices is closely related to the literature on announcements, as announcements are obvious candidates to explain jumps. Three recent papers have looked at discontinuities in U.S. Treasury prices. Huang [47] estimates daily jumps with bi-power variation on 10 years of 5-minute data on S&P 500 and U.S. T-bond futures to measure the response of volatility and jumps to macro news. He identifies a major role for payroll news in bond market jumps by analyzing their conditional distributions and regressing continuous and jump components on measures of disagreement and uncertainty concerning future macroeconomic states. Huang [47] also finds that the bond market is relatively more responsive than the equity market.
Dungey, McKenzie, and Smith [19] estimate jumps and cojumps (simultaneous discontinuities in multiple markets) in the term structure of U.S. Treasury rates. They find that the middle of the yield curve often cojumps with one of the ends, while the ends of the curve exhibit a greater tendency for idiosyncratic jumps. Macro news is strongly associated with cojumps in the term structure. Using BrokerTec data from 2003-2005, Jiang, Lo, and Verdelhan [48] extend this work by focusing on the role of liquidity shocks-estimated from the limit order book-in jumps and the relation of jumps to order flow and price discovery.
Lahaye, Laurent and Neely [54] examine jumps and cojumps across foreign exchange, stock, gold and 30-year Treasury futures. Discontinuities in bond futures prices were larger but less frequent than those in foreign exchange rates and smaller and about as frequent as those in equity markets. News announcements appear to cause many cojumps of bond prices with prices of other types of assets.
Order Flow in the U.S. Treasury Market
The effect of order flow on prices has been a popular recent topic in microstructure. Several papers have explored the impact of order flow on prices and the ways in which macro/monetary announcements influence these impacts.
Huang, Cai, and Wang [46] use intraday 1998 GovPX spot data on the 5-year Treasury note to characterize trading patterns of primary dealers, announcement effects and volatility-volume relations. The paper finds that both public information (i.e., announcements) and dealer inventory/order flow affect trading frequency.
Green [37] uses the Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans [55] model to study the impact of GovPX trading in 5-year around announcements. Order flow has its largest price impact after larger macro surprises, times of greater uncertainty about the announcement, and times of high liquidity. Green [37] concludes that order flow does reveal information about riskless rates.
Brandt and Kavajecz [10] find that order flow imbalances can explain up to 26% of the dayto-day variation in yields on non-announcement days. In contrast to Green [37] , they find that order flow has its strongest impact at times of low liquidity. Brandt, Kavacejz, and Underwood [11] extend the work of Brandt and Kavajecz [10] to control for trader type and macroeconomic announcements in explaining the impact of bond market order flow on futures prices.
Menkveld, Sarkar, and Van der Wel [56] confirm earlier conclusions that announcements have significant effects on 30-year Treasury yields and they also find that customer order flow is much more informative on announcement days than on non-announcement days. They go on to investigate the profits that different types of traders make on announcement and non-announcement days.
At high frequencies, order flow is highly autocorrelated. A dynamic analysis of the market resilience requires modeling this formally. We turn to empirical modeling of the Treasury market order book in the next section. 18 
Modeling The Limit Order Book
A purchase or a sale of a Treasury bond influences prices directly as trades work their way up the supply or demand curves. We would like to know whether these effects are large and long-lasting.
To address this question, we must introduce a dynamic model of the limit order book.
Hasbrouck [44] proposed to study intra-day price formation with a standard bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Time t here is measured in 1-minute intervals. Let r t be the percentage change in the transaction price and x 0 t be the sum of signed trade indicators (+1 for buyer initiated, −1 for seller initiated) over minute t. Treasury market data sets typically indicate trade initiation as a "hit" −1 or a "take" +1.
The bivariate vector autoregression assumes that causality flows from trade initiation to returns by permitting r t to depend on the contemporaneous value for x 0 t , but not allowing x 0 t to depend on contemporaneous r t . The model for returns is specified as follows 
Price Discovery
A crucial issue in the market microstructure literature is price discovery. This is the process by which prices embed new information. In the Treasury market, price discovery occurs in both the secondary spot market and in the futures markets at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). The degree to which each market contributes to price discovery is a natural issue to address.
To investigate relative price discovery in these two Treasury markets, Mizrach and Neely [59] 19 follow Hasbrouck [44] and assume that the price series have a unit root, are cointegrated, and have an r th order VAR representation,
It follows that the N returns,
have the convenient Engle-Granger [24] error-correction representation,
where z t is an error-correction term of rank N − 1.
We analyze price discovery using the moving average representation of our return process (3),
The disturbances are mean zero and serially uncorrelated, E[ε i,t ] = 0 and cov[ε i,t , ε i,t−r ] = 0, but they may be contemporaneously correlated, cov[ε i,t , ε j,t ] = 0.
The information share is related to the long run impulse responses,
, the permanent effect of the shock vector on the Treasury prices. Cointegration makes the long run multipliers common across all markets,
To eliminate contemporaneous correlation among the error terms in (5), we decompose Ω = E [ε t ε t ], the N × N covariance matrix, to find a lower triangular matrix M , whose i, j th element we denote m ij , such that M M = Ω. The Hasbrouck [44] information share for market j is defined as
where the θ i s are the elements of row i of the long-run multipliers in (6) . Because the Choleski decomposition is not unique, the information share will vary with the order of the equations in the VAR.
Mizrach and Neely [59] pair spot and maturity matched futures for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year on-the-run spot notes. This calculation requires us to adjust futures prices according to the on-the-run spot instruments with which we compare them. The CBOT provides adjustment 20 factors for each instrument. These adjustments typically make a single bond the cheapest to deliver (CTD), but the CTD is typically off-the-run. Nevertheless, the CTD off-the-run bonds and the most liquid on-the-run bonds are very close substitutes-their daily returns are highly correlatedso it is reasonable to examine price discovery between futures prices and on-the-run bonds, despite the fact that they are not identical.
Mizrach and Neely [59] find that information shares rise with the growth of the GovPX market, but fall as the ECNs take market share from GovPX voice markets. The spot market share is highest for the 2-year note, reaching 86%, while the 10-year spot market share never exceeds 50%.
In addition, relative market liquidity measures like spreads, trades and volatility each strongly explain daily relative price discovery shares. Mizrach and Neely [59] Capital Management Crisis, the spot market information share falls to essentially zero. Upper and Werner [67] , however, compare the futures market to the relatively illiquid, CTD bonds. This might explain their finding that the spot market does very little price discovery. 
Future Directions
